Washington Must Get Out Of Europe’s Way On Defense

Europe is signaling that it is ready to rearm. If the effort falls short it would not be the first time, but stark changes in the US-Europe relationship have created new urgency in European capitals. To be successful, Europe must not only find more money to spend on military hardware but also invest that money at home buying European-made weapons.

And the United States, historically protective of US defense firms, must break with past precedent and encourage them to do so.

There are signals that the Trump administration may be more open to the development of an autonomous European defense industry than its predecessors. In his remarks to the Ukraine Defense Contact Group in February 2024, for instance, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth made a promise to his counterparts. The United States, he said, will “prioritize empowering Europe to own responsibility for its own security.” If President Donald Trump and his advisors hope to reduce the US defense burden in Europe, limit US involvement in Ukraine, and focus more attention on Asia, they must stick to this commitment.

The first reason for this is practical. US defense firms are simply not capable of meeting Europe’s extensive and comprehensive military requirements on the necessary, urgent timelines. US military contractors like Lockheed Martin and RTX are oversubscribed. It is not uncommon for countries to wait years for their orders of US-made tanks, missiles, aircraft, and other systems. With the growing US focus on Asia and concerns about US military readiness, European buyers often find themselves at the back of the queue.

Poland offers a good example of the constraints created by the realities of US defense production. In the fall of 2024, Poland entered negotiations to buy 100 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), as part of a framework agreement that would allow Warsaw to acquire up to 486 systems. At current production rates, however, even if every US-made HIMARS went to Poland, it would take over two years to fill the first part of the order and more than five years to produce all 486 units. Since there are other buyers, the actual timelines would likely be even longer. Warsaw’s effort to buy over 1,000 new main battle tanks have also run into obstacles created by slow US production.

And Poland is not alone in facing delays. Some of Germany’s most recent US defense orders including Patriot air defense missiles and F-35 aircraft similarly won’t arrive until almost 2030. Estonia, too, has raised questions about the delivery timelines of its orders. Europe cannot wait a decade to fill its many military gaps, and Washington seems equally impatient. If the Trump team wants Europe to take most responsibility for its own defense in this decade, Europe will need its own dedicated suppliers.

A robust and self-sustaining European defense industry is also the key to the Trump administration’s plans for Ukraine. Like previous US presidents, Trump has assessed that the United States has limited interests in Ukraine’s future security. Trump’s team has no plans to continue aid to Ukraine indefinitely, and has rejected proposals that leave the United States with lasting liabilities in Ukraine.

But Trump is also eager for a permanent end to the war, the associated drain on US military resources, and the ever-present risk of a US-Russia conflict. A strong and largely self-sustaining European defense industrial base able to credibly arm Ukraine to defend itself without external assistance offers Washington an exit ramp and a pathway to peace with no US strings attached.

The second reason Trump and his advisors should want Europe to supply its own military equipment is strategic. The administration has made clear that it sees China, and not Russia, as the primary US adversary and wants to focus as much of its defense budget as possible on arming the US military and its Asian allies for Indo-Pacific contingencies.

While preparations for these potential conflicts overlap in some places with Europe’s defense requirements—for example air defense, drones, and munitions—there are also vast differences. Europe must prepare for the possibility of a grinding land war of attrition, and the United States is focused on equipping itself for a long-distance fight that will occur primarily at sea.

Given stark resource and workforce constraints, the choice to orient the US defense industrial base to rebuild European armies would mean less investment in capabilities essential for US military activities in Asia. A self-sustaining European defense that generates less materiel demand in the United States, on the other hand, would allow the Trump administration to shift defense industrial funds to areas deemed most vital to US national security — ships, submarines, and long-range munitions.

If the Trump administration sticks with its pledge and pushes Europe to spend its defense euros on European-made equipment, it will face pushback from two domestic constituencies: defense contractors worried about their bottom lines and members of Congress protecting their districts. Trump and his advisors should not back down. Even if reduced European defense dependence comes with some costs, the strategic upside should make up for them.

US defense firms currently face demand that exceeds their capacity, so even as European self-sufficiency will mean some lost business in the long term, American firms will feel no pinch overnight. Even if all countries in Europe quickly reach the 5 percent of GDP defense spending benchmark that Trump has proposed, it will take at least five years for European defense firms to build the workforce and production capacity to replace US weapons suppliers. European customers also might not wean themselves entirely, continuing to rely on US firms for small quantities of the most advanced systems. Moreover, as this transition occurs, there will be no shortage of eager new buyers; given ongoing wars and global insecurity, orders for US weapons will likely continue to increase, even if Europe goes its own way.

For the same reasons, the concerns of Congress can be largely put aside. Jobs may shift within the defense sector but these changes will happen slowly, and overwhelming demand for weapons and shortages of trained personnel should limit long-term job losses, especially with investments in retraining. Trump and his advisors will need to push for European defense industrial independence in the early days, when Europe still relies on the United States, and later, when it can do more without US help.

For its part, Europe should hold the Trump administration to their word. European leaders should invest massively in their national and collective defense industrial base, limiting purchases of US military equipment and giving preference to their own suppliers. At the same time, they should embrace a new narrative.

Rather than being aggrieved at what they see as US abandonment, they should champion the new freedom that will come with self-reliance.

Jennifer Kavanagh is a Senior Fellow & Director of Military Analysis at Defense Priorities.